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Just as it is important to "document that cross burnings are more
than 'arson' and that swastikas painted on synagogues are more than'vandalism,"' it is important to recognize gender-motivated violence
for what it is: a violent form of gender oppression.'
Most people in the United States intuitively understand that
burning a cross on a front lawn of an African-American's home or
defacing a Jewish house of worship with a Nazi symbol is wrong.
Legally, however, those actions were not prohibited until thirty-four
years ago, when Congress passed landmark civil rights legislation.2
Most people also instinctively know that targeting an individual for
oppression based on gender is morally wrong. But unlike the
protection of the law for those who might be targeted because of race
or religion, a victim of gender-motivated violence only recently
received the protection of federal laws. In 1994, Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),3 which created a civil right
to be free from gender-motivated violence. And, like the race-based
civil rights legislation that was repeatedly attacked on constitutional
grounds, VAWA is currently the subject of heated debates in federal
courts. While those earlier civil rights were created under the auspices
t 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,4 Congress
created VAWA through use of its enumerated power to regulate
interstate commerce.' But is gender-motivated violence sufficiently
connected to interstate commerce to justify Congress's use of its
commerce power?
The notion of "interstate commerce" has changed dramatically
since the Constitution was adopted over 200 years ago. While
Congress could regulate, through its commerce power, the delivery of
goods between Vermont and New York in 1789, wholly intrastate
commercial activities were not under congressional authority.' Today,
however, Congress may exercise its commerce authority to regulate
wholly intrastate activities with little direct connection to commerce if
it finds that those activities substantially affect interstate commerce.7
Congress's commerce power has significantly expanded over the years,
but has it expanded enough to cover the creation of VAWA's civil
right to be free from gender-motivated violence?
The answer to that question became murkier in 1995, when the
United States Supreme Court complicated the Commerce Clause
debate with its ruling in United States v. Lopez.' In a five-to-four
decision, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
holding that Congress, in enacting the legislation, overstepped the
4. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
5. The Commerce Clause, article 1, section 8, clause 3, of the United States Constitution,
states: "The Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In
addition, the Necessary and Proper Clause, article 1, section 8, clause 18, gives Congress the
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 18.
6. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
that Congress could not use its commerce power to regulate activities with no direct impact on
interstate commerce, as the power existed only to allow regulation of commerce between the
states, and intrastate activities are, by definition, not interstate.).
7. See generally Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-129 (1942) (holding regulation of
home-grown wheat consumption by the farmer impacted interstate commerce, although it was
never in commerce at all); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding
that intrastate activities that have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce may be
regulated by Congress through its commerce power); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1165-
66 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding Congress may ban the distribution of illegal drugs in a school zone
under its commerce power); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that Congress may regulate private wetlands for the benefit of migratory waterfowl
under its commerce power).
8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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boundary of its commerce power.9 That fractured decision represents
either a contraction of the previously expansive Commerce Clause
authority or a limited ruling that has little or no impact on future
commerce power debates. In the three years since Lopez, the high
Court has denied certiorari on every case that deals with the Commerce
Clause."0
VAWA's constitutionality could be the issue that the Supreme
Court uses to clarify the Lopez ruling. In December 1997, a three-
judge panel of the Fourth Circuit, in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
and State University, issued the first federal appellate court ruling on
VAWA's constitutionality. 1 The Fourth Circuit has since vacated
the panel's ruling and granted a rehearing en banc. 12 Regardless of
the outcome of the en banc hearing, VAWA appears ripe for Supreme
Court review. However, the question remains whether the Court will
grant certiorari should the parties appeal the forthcoming Fourth
Circuit en banc ruling.
This Comment explores whether the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari in the Brzonkala case, and whether the Court will uphold
VAWA as a constitutional use of the commerce power. Part I explains
the provisions of VAWA. Part II scrutinizes the development of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which culminated in the Lopez
decision. Part III analyzes the panel's Fourth Circuit ruling in
Brzonkala. Part IV reviews the Supreme Court's handling of post-
Lopez Commerce Clause cases and discusses whether the Court will
grant certiorari to a challenge of VAWA's constitutionality. Finally,
Part V examines arguments regarding VAWA's constitutionality. This
Comment concludes that the Supreme Court will probably deny
certiorari in the Brzonkala case. However, should the Court grant
review, it will likely find VAWA a constitutionally permissible use of
the commerce power.
I. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1994
Before analyzing whether VAWA is constitutional, one must first
understand what VAWA provides and why Congress enacted it.
VAWA permits victims of gender-motivated violence to sue in federal
9. Id. at 551.
10. See The Lopez Watch, 21 ADMIN. & RFG. L. NEWS 4, 4 (Winter 1996); see also docket
of U.S. Supreme Court for 1997-98; and docket of U.S. Supreme Court for 1996-97, available in
7-9-96 West's Legal News 6599, 1996 WL 379521.
11. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated and reh'g en banc granted (Order Granting Rehearing, Feb. 5, 1998, (Case No. 96-1814)).
12. Id.
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court to recover compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropri-
ate. 3 The congressional purpose in enacting the legislation was "to
protect the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence and to
promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
14
VAWA's civil right is simply that "[a]ll persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender. '"S But that seemingly broad right was
significantly narrowed later in the statute when Congress defined a
"crime of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender[.]"' 6  In
addition, Congress further limited access to a VAWA claim by
excluding "random acts of violence unrelated to gender"17 and "acts
that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
be motivated by gender[.]"' 8
Congress claimed it had the authority to enact VAWA under both
the Commerce Clause and under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9  Before Lopez in 1995, the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence seemed to support Congress's
claim. However, Lopez called into question both the breadth of the
commerce power and VAWA's constitutionality.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
14. Id. § 13981(a).
15. Id. § 13981(b).
16. Id. § 13981(d)(1).
17. Id. § 13981(e)(1) (emphasis added).
18. Id. § 13981(e)(1).
19. This Comment will deal only with the Commerce Clause. For analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause as a basis for upholding VAWA's constitutionality, see generally Johanne R.
Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE
L.J. 1849 (1997); Chris A. Rauschl, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University: Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth Amendment-Defining
Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1601 (1997).
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II. THE COLLISION OF EXPANSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The debate over VAWA's constitutionality joins a long line of
Commerce Clause debates, many of which came before the U.S.
Supreme Court.2" Some scholars argue that Congress has long used
the Commerce Clause to pass legislation beyond the authority granted
by the Constitution,2 while others contend that Congress's commerce
power is so broad that, as long as a rational basis exists to connect an
activity to interstate commerce, any legislation is constitutional.22
A. The Commerce Clause Cases Prior to 1995
The Supreme Court restricted congressional use of the commerce
power in the early part of this century by requiring regulations to have
a direct link to interstate commerce.23 During this period, the Court
struck down legislation when the activities regulated had no direct
impact on interstate commerce. The Court held that such legislation
went beyond the scope of a power that existed only to allow congres-
sional regulation of interstate commerce.
24
However, the Court retreated from such a restrictive view of
congressional authority in the New Deal Era. As Congress promulgat-
ed legislation to carry out the social agenda of the period, links between
interstate commerce and the activities regulated became progressively
weaker and more indirect.25  But instead of striking down such
legislation, the Supreme Court upheld even regulation of wholly
intrastate activities26 and activities that were not strictly "commer-
20. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV., 167 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996).
23. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (striking down regulations fixing
hours and wages of those employed by an intrastate business because the activity being regulated
only indirectly impacted interstate commerce).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 1 (holding that intrastate activities
that have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce may be regulated by Congress through
its commerce power, effectively departing from the direct-indirect distinction).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (wages and hours for employees
in a lumber mill); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (the price of milk
produced, processed, and sold in Illinois).
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cial. "27 The Court allowed legislation to stand so long as Congress
had a rational basis for finding at least a minimal connection to
interstate commerce.28 While the Court indicated that some limit
existed on Commerce Clause power, it declined to draw that line.
29
Such deference to Congress continued until the Lopez decision in 1995,
when the Court drew a line, albeit one that is far from bright.
B. United States v. Lopez
In 1995, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990"0 by a five-to-four vote in United States v.
Lopez.31 The Act made it a federal crime to possess a gun in a school
zone. The fractured Court included six justices who either dissent-
ed outright or concurred with strong reservations. 33  The majority
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, held that Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause authority in passing the Act because carrying a
gun in a school zone does not substantially affect interstate com-
merce.34 However, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor filed a reserved
concurrence hinting that they might break with the other three justices
on future Commerce Clause cases, although they agreed that the law
at issue in Lopez was unconstitutional.3" Meanwhile, the spirited
dissents filed by Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
promised a continuing battle should the Court attempt to apply Lopez
to future Commerce Clause cases. 6
1. The Majority's View of the Commerce Clause Power
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority when it passed the
27. See Wickard, 317 U.S. ill (holding the consumption of home-grown wheat, while not
commercial in itself, affected interstate commerce because the impact on the interstate wheat
market if all farmers ate wheat they grew rather than wheat they purchased was "far from
trivial").
28. Id. at 118-29.
29. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (stating that although Congress's
commerce power was broad, it had limits that the Supreme Court had "ample power" to enforce).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (Supp. 1998).
31. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1998 Supp. 1998).
33. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-631.
34. Id. at 551-68.
35. Id. at 568-83 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
36. Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603-15 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615-31
(Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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Gun-Free School Zones Act.37 The Court ruled that the Act "neither
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
[firearm] possession be connected in any way to interstate com-
merce."38
In striking down the Act, the Court held that legislation falls
under the Commerce Clause authority only if it regulates (1) the use
of channels of interstate commerce,39 (2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce,4" or (3) activities that have a substantial relation
to interstate commerce." While the first two categories are bright-
line rules, the Court admitted that precedent was unclear as to whether
an activity had merely to affect interstate commerce or "substantially
affect" it.
42
The Court devised three tests to determine whether a regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 43  First, the Court
looked at whether the regulated activity was commercial or somehow
necessary for the continuance of a commercial activity.44 Second, the
Court examined whether the statute required a jurisdictional nexus to
interstate commerce. 4s Finally, the Court examined whether Congress
made a finding, based on some rational basis (such as empirical data)
that there was a connection to interstate commerce.46
The first test asks whether the regulated activity is itself a
commercial activity or an activity required to carry on a commercial
activity.47 In this category, the Court included such activities as
37. Id. at 551.
38. Id.
39. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (based on Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)
("[Tihe authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and
injurious uses has been frequently sustained and is no longer open to question.")).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 558-59.
42. Id. at 559.
43. Lower courts have attempted to clarify the three tests. At least one court's dissent has
posited that the test is actually a three-part hierarchy under which the first part must be met
before the second and third parts come into play. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444 (6th
Cir. 1995) (Boggs, J., dissenting). However, if an activity complies with the criteria that the
regulated activity be commercial or somehow necessary for the continuance of a commercial
activity, the second and third parts would be irrelevant. Such an activity already has a basis for
constitutional regulation under the commerce power. Surely a jurisdictional nexus or legislative
findings of a connection to interstate commerce would be unnecessary to uphold a law that already
regulates a commercial activity. Therefore, it is more likely that the three parts explained in
Lopez are options, any of which could lead to upholding a law as a proper exercise of the
commerce power.
44. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 562-63.
47. Id. at 559-60.
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48intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortion credit transactions (also
known as loan sharking), 49 restaurants that use supplies obtained
through interstate commerce,"0 inns and motels that cater to interstate
guests,," and consumption of home-grown wheat that in the aggregate
affected the price on the interstate wheat market.5 2 However, if an
activity was not itself commercial or if its regulation was not necessary
to protect interstate commerce, the Court held that to regulate it would
be an unconstitutional use of the commerce power.
3
Under the second test, also known as a jurisdictional nexus test,
legislation that does not meet the first test may still be found constitu-
tional. To meet this test, the legislation must specifically require
plaintiffs to demonstrate an impact on interstate commerce to be
successful. 4  As long as the statute requires this connection to
interstate commerce, the Court will uphold such legislation.
The third test requires an examination of an act's legislative
history to determine whether Congress explicitly found a connection
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 5 While the
Court acknowledged that Congress is not required to make formal
findings of that sort, it said that the lack of such findings could make
it impossible for the Court to see a connection to interstate commerce
when "no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.
56
This dicta implies that even if the Court fails to see the connection,
formal findings by Congress could be enough for the Court to validate
the use of the commerce power.
In Lopez, the government argued that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act met the third test despite a lack of formal congressional findings
because (1) the cost of medical care for victims of gun-related violence
was substantial, and thus interstate commerce was substantially
affected in the form of medical insurance; (2) gun-related violence
resulted in less interstate travel to areas that were perceived as unsafe
because of that violence; and (3) the presence of guns in schools
threatened the educational process and resulted in poorly educated
citizens who in turn adversely affected interstate commerce.
5 7
48. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
49. See Perez v. United States, 406 U.S. 146 (1971).
50. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
51. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
52. See Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. at 111 (1942).
53. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
54. Id. at 561-62.
55. Id. at 562-63.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 563-64.
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The Court rejected two of the government's arguments.
Analyzing the first argument, the Court reasoned that if it was valid
Congress could regulate almost anything that might lead to violent
crime because of the impact on medical insurance."8 Analyzing the
third argument, the Court held that to link firearm possession in a
school zone to a substantial affect on interstate commerce, the Court
would have to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." 9
However, the Court did not discuss the second argument, that
gun-related violence in school zones could affect interstate travel to
school zones.6" The Court's reasons for ignoring this point are
unknown. Consequently, its failure to address the issue left intact
prior rulings holding that an impact on interstate travel was sufficient
to make congressional use of the commerce power constitutional.6'
2. The Kennedy-O'Connor Concurrence
While agreeing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an
impermissible use of the commerce power, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor expressed severe reservations about the Court's power to
limit that congressional authority.62  The opening paragraph of the
concurrence amply expresses these reservations:
The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce
Clause during the transition from the economic system the Founders
knew to the single, national market still emergent in our own era
counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause
is insufficient to support an exercise of the national power. That
history gives me some pause about today's decision, but I join the
Court's opinion with these observations on what I conceive to be its
necessary though limited holding.63
The concurrence agreed that the Supreme Court has the authority
to review congressional actions that attempt to alter the federal balance.
However, the concurrence stated, "[T]he substantial element of
political judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves our institutional
capacity to intervene more in doubt. "64 In this statement, the
58. Id. at 564-65.
59. Id. at 567.
60. See id. at 563-68.
61. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 241 (1964).
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83.
63. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 579.
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concurrence appears to argue that the judicial branch has the power to
say what the law is but that decisions based on political reasoning are
the province of the legislative branch.6"
Next, the concurrence notes the concurring justices' reluctance to
overturn any commerce power legislation unless either no clear
connection to interstate commerce exists or the regulation infringes
upon a traditional area of state concern.66 If in any legislation
Congress claims to find a connection to interstate commerce, which it
did not in Lopez, then the Court would proceed to examine whether
the exercise of the commerce power intrudes upon an area traditionally
of state concern.67 By this statement, the concurring justices indicated
their general deference to Congress by refusing to critically evaluate the
basis for the interstate commerce connection. Instead, the Court
should only examine the legislation if it infringes on powers, such as
the police power, reserved to the states.
3. The Dissent
The primary dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, stated that the Court should
follow three basic principles when dealing with Commerce Clause
cases: (1) Congress has the power to regulate local activities that
significantly affect interstate commerce;6" (2) the Court must consider
the cumulative effect of all instances of the regulated conduct, not
merely the single case that is brought before it;69 and (3) the Court
must grant deference to Congress when Congress finds a connection
70 thsbetween the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Of these
principles, the dissent and the majority disagreed only as to the third.
The dissent claimed that the Court must grant deference because
"the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to Congress
and because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a
kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy. '' Therefore, the Court should only review whether
Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a connection
between an activity and interstate commerce, not whether the Court
65. See also Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 258-259
(1996).
66. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580-83.
67. Id. at 580.
68. Id. at 615.
69. Id. at 616.
70. Id. at 616-17.
71. Id.
1260 [Vol. 21:12 51
VA WA and Interstate Commerce
believes that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce.72
The dissent rejected the majority's emphasis on formal congressional
findings to help it determine whether a rational basis existed because
"the absence of findings, at most, deprives a statute of the benefit of
some extra leeway. This extra deference, in principle, might change
the result in a close case.
'73
The dissent relied on numerous studies that empirically docu-
mented the connection between violence at school and a significant
interference with educational quality.74  The dissent noted that
diminished educational quality reduces the productivity of workers and
that, in today's global economy, decreased productivity could hamper
commerce with foreign countries. 71 In addition, the diminished
quality of education in areas where school violence is a factor may
affect where firms conduct interstate commerce because "many firms
base their location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work
force with a basic education."76
In conclusion, the dissent stated that the Court should have
upheld the Gun-Free School Zones Act: "Upholding this legislation
would do no more than simply recognize that Congress had a 'rational
basis' for finding a significant connection between guns in or near
school, and (through their effect on education) the interstate and
foreign commerce they threaten."77
4. The Meaning of Lopez
The majority of the Court was fractured by the reserved concur-
rence of two of its five members. Consequently, the meaning of the
Lopez test is difficult to ascertain. The majority seemed to move from
a rational basis test that grants deference to Congress toward a test that
requires empirical data to support congressional findings of a substan-
tial affect on interstate commerce.7' However, the Kennedy-O'Con-
nor concurrence seemed hesitant to use such a test, absent a total lack
of connection to interstate commerce or infringement upon a traditional
area of state concern.
72. Id. at 617.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 619.
75. See id. at 621-22.
76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 622.
77. Id. at 631.
78. See Larry E. Gee, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of
Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress' Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 151,
191 (1995).
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That hesitance may explain the short-lived decision of the three-
judge panel in the Fourth Circuit that voted two-to-one to uphold the
constitutionality of VAWA in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and
State University.79 That decision stood for just six weeks, until
February 5, 1998 when the Fourth Circuit granted a request to vacate
the decision and grant a rehearing en banc. ° Oral arguments on the
en banc rehearing were held on March 5, 1998, but a decision is still
pending.
Although the three-judge panel's initial ruling was vacated, this
Comment will examine the rationale of both the majority and
dissenting opinions, as each made interesting points in the ongoing
debate over the constitutionality of VAWA.
III. THE PANEL'S VIEW OF VAWA
The panel's majority upheld the constitutionality of VAWA.5'
In doing so, the majority read Lopez in the manner that this Comment
does: first determining whether Congress had a rational basis to find
the connection to interstate commerce and then analyzing whether
VAWA usurped state authority. Determining that there was a rational
basis for the congressional findings and that VAWA regulates an area
that is quintessentially federal, the majority held that VAWA is
constitutional.82 Meanwhile, the panel dissent referred to the majori-
ty's opinion as "analytical superficiality" and claimed the majority
suffered from a "manifest misreading of the Supreme Court's
historically significant Lopez decision."83
A. The Panel Majority's Opinion
The majority began its analysis with Congress's "voluminous
findings" that supported the connection between gender-motivated
violence and interstate commerce.84 The majority's favorable impres-
sion of the basis upon which Congress enacted VAWA is apparent
79. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) vacated and rehearing granted (Order Granting Rehearing
Feb. 5, 1998 (Case No. 96-1814)). Christy Brzonkala claimed her civil right under VAWA to
be free from gender-motivated violence was violated by two male students who allegedly gang-
raped her in a campus dormitory. She had met the men less than 30 minutes before the attack.
As a result of the attack, Brzonkala withdrew from school and returned to her home state of
Minnesota, saying she was afraid to continue her education at the Virginia campus because of the
threat of further gender-motivated violence. Id. at 953.
80. See Order Granting Rehearing, Feb. 5, 1998 (Case No. 96-1814).
81. Id.
82. Brzonhala, 132 F.3d at 963-73.
83. Id. at 974 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 96S.
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from the first paragraph in which it discusses the finding of the
connection.8" Terms used by the judges to discuss Congress' formal
findings include "numerous and specific findings and a mountain of
evidence, '"86 "detailed and extensive, '"87 and "exhaustive and meticu-
lous investigation. '... After examining some of the numerous
findings,89 the panel majority stated that "Congress made an unequiv-
ocal and persuasive finding that violence against women substantially
affects interstate commerce." '9° It also noted that, in recent Com-
merce Clause cases, the Fourth Circuit had relied on less extensive
findings to validate congressional action. 1  Therefore, the panel
majority had "no hesitation similarly upholding VAWA."92
The opinion, however, did not stop at the rational basis test but
also discussed whether VAWA invades traditional areas of state
concern.93 First, the panel majority said that VAWA is a civil rights
statute, not a criminal statute; therefore, the Act does not usurp the
state's traditional power in the criminal justice arena. 4 Second, the
panel majority said that federal civil rights have been a "federal
responsibility since shortly after the Civil War," making federal civil
rights legislation "a quintessential area of federal expertise."95
The panel majority found that Congress not only understood its
Commerce Clause authority when it enacted VAWA, but it took that
enumerated power seriously and acted within its boundaries. 6
Therefore, the majority found that VAWA's civil right to be free from
gender-motivated violence was a constitutionally permissible exercise
of the commerce power. 97
85. Id. at 964.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 966.
88. Id. at 967.
89. Id. at 965-68.
90. Id. at 968.
91. Id. at 968-69; see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
92. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 968.
93. Id. at 970-71.
94. Id. at 970.
95. Id. at 971.
96. Id. at 972-73.
97. Id. at 974.
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B. The Panel's Dissenting Opinion
The panel dissent believed that the majority made a fundamental
mistake by misreading Lopez and conducting only a superficial
evaluation of the connection between interstate commerce and gender-
motivated violence,98 In particular, the dissent criticized the majority
opinion because it "merely recites several statements from the House
and Senate committees ... and then simply states, without more, that
the Act is constitutional."99  Because the dissent believed that the
majority failed to critically analyze the connection, the dissent argued
that the majority completely disregarded the Lopez requirement that a
reviewing court conduct an "independent evaluation" of the connec-
tion.'00  The panel dissent argued that Congress's findings are
nothing more than a single conclusory statement that there is a
connection, a finding that is "functionally no different from a complete
absence of express congressional findings..'' °  The dissent claimed
the majority acted as if Lopez had never been decided, and concluded
with a prediction that the Supreme Court would not allow such "bold
intransigence in the face of the Court's recent [Lopez] decision.
"102
The Fourth Circuit is regarded as the most conservative bench in
the country.10 3  Recognizing that the court's conservative nature
could portend an unfavorable result for her client, Brzonkala attorney
Eileen Wagner said she treated the oral arguments on rehearing as "a
dress rehearsal for our arguments in Washington" in front of the U.S.
Supreme Court.0 4
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF POST-LOPEZ CASES
The Supreme Court may decline to hear a challenge to the Fourth
Circuit's Brzonkala ruling regardless of which party is ultimately
successful on rehearing. Since the Lopez decision in 1995, the Supreme




101. Id. at 976.
102. Id. at 977.
103. Jan Vertefeuille, Appeals Court Scrutinizes Violence Against Women Act, ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS, March 4, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 5898473.
104. Full Appeals Court to Hear Tech Case, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 1998,
at C3, available in 1998 WL 2026122.
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denied all thirty-five such requests in 1995-96." °' No such cases
were among those heard in the 1996-97 and 1997-98 court dockets.
Thus, declining to hear the challenge to VAWA would be consistent
with the Court's recent approach to Commerce Clause cases.
Of those thirty-five Commerce Clause cases that the Supreme
Court refused to hear in 1995, thirty-four of the appellate court cases
upheld the congressional use of the commerce power. 106 Several of
those cases involved activities with a connection to interstate commerce
that seemed nearly as tenuous as that struck down by the Supreme
Court in Lopez. For example, in United States v. Clark,"7 a law
banning distribution of illegal drugs within 1,000 feet of a school
mirrors the Gun-Free School Zones Act of Lopez.' The most
significant difference between the two laws was that illegal drugs were
banned instead of guns. Yet, the Fifth Circuit upheld the law, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. °9
Based on the repeated denials of certiorari on cases in which
circuit courts have upheld a statute's constitutionality, the Supreme
Court may deny certiorari to Brzonkala's opponents should she prevail
in the en banc decision. The four Lopez dissenters each are unlikely to
vote in favor of certiorari on cases in which the appellate court upheld
the constitutionality of a statute. Such an appellate court ruling is
consistent with the dissenters' belief that courts should grant Congress
deference on Commerce Clause cases. 110
If the Fourth Circuit instead finds VAWA unconstitutional,
however, the Court's reaction to a request for certiorari is more
difficult to predict.
The Lopez dissenters may want to grant certiorari in an effort to
limit Lopez's application to future Commerce Clause cases. Although
the dissenters have enough votes to grant certiorari, they may
nevertheless make a strategic decision not to grant certiorari unless they
are certain another justice will join them in limiting Lopez's scope and
reinstating VAWA. The dissenters would thus be trying to avoid the
risk of a majority that could expand Lopez's application to future
Commerce Clause cases.
105. The Lopez Watch, 21 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 (1996).
106. See 7-9-96 West's Legal News 6599, 1996 WL 379521.
107. 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1141.
108. Compare the statute at issue in Clark, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (Supp. 1998), with the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 at issue in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 1998).
109. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1141.
110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-17.
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The five justices who made up the Lopez majority might also
tread carefully on a request for certiorari from either side in Brzonkala.
Even if four votes were granted for certiorari, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor stated in their Lopez concurrence that they were hesitant to
expand Lopez to other Commerce Clause cases and would wait for an
"appropriate juncture" before they would "modify our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.""' Therefore, the other three majority justices
would be wary of granting certiorari if they want Lopez to continue to
have broad application. Thus, if the four Lopez dissenters who want
to narrow Lopez can persuade Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor to
join them, Lopez could become a mere footnote in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and limited to its facts.
With these caveats in mind, the issue of certiorari for Brzonkala,
if requested, appears to depend on whether the Lopez concurring
justices agree that the issue of VAWA's constitutionality comes at such
an "appropriate juncture" that the Supreme Court should "modify our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence." If they find it does, the question
then becomes whether Lopez will be narrowed to its facts or expanded
to apply to every Commerce Clause case. Now, the issue is whether
VAWA comes at such an "appropriate juncture" and should be
granted certiorari.
V. How WILL THE SUPREME COURT RULE IF VAWA Is
GRANTED CERTIORARI?
Assuming the Supreme Court does eventually receive a request for
certiorari in the Brzonkala case and grants it, the Court's application
of Lopez will determine VAWA's constitutionality. The Lopez test
asks if the activity being regulated is (1) a channel of interstate
commerce, (2) an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or (3)
substantially affects interstate commerce. 112 Because gender-motivat-
ed violence is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of commerce,
VAWA must "substantially affect" interstate commerce to be
constitutional.
The three Lopez methods to determine if an activity substantially
affects interstate commerce will therefore be dispositive."' Those
methods ask (1) does VAWA regulate a commercial activity?; (2) does
VAWA have a jurisdictional nexus that requires gender-motivated
violence to substantially affect interstate commerce?; and (3) does
111. Id. at 602.
112. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
113. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602; see also supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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VAWA have legislative history that demonstrates the connection
Congress found between gender-motivated violence and interstate
commerce?" 4 Because gender motivated violence is not a commercial
activity and VAWA contains no jurisdictional nexus, VAWA must
contain congressional findings as to the connection to interstate
commerce.
A. The Connection of Gender-Motivated Violence to
Interstate Commerce
The Court should uphold VAWA because (1) Congress made
specific findings to support its rational basis for the connection to
interstate commerce, and (2) the connection is analogous to other
connections upheld as constitutional in prior cases involving racially-
motivated violence and its impact on interstate travel.
1. Congress Found a Connection in the Statistics of
Gender Violence
First, after four years of hearings that examined data on the
economic impact of rape and domestic violence,"'5 Congress provided
more than enough information to support its finding of the connection
between interstate commerce and gender-motivated violence." 6 Early
in the debate, Congress heard testimony that a woman is raped every
five minutes but that half of the women who are raped never report
it." 7 While the effect on the individual rape victim is traumatic, the
harm to the collective psyche of women is often overlooked.1
Unlike potential victims of other violent crimes, women cannot insulate
themselves from the threat of rape because women can do nothing to
change the biggest risk factor for rape-being female." 9  Former
President George Bush acknowledged the cumulative effect of gender-
motivated violence and its connection to interstate commerce when he
said, "[W]omen will never have the same opportunities as men if a
climate of fear leaves them justifiably ... reluctant to work late hours
for fear of getting out of some parking lot safely.' 120
114. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, pt. 11, at 25-29 (1993), microformed on Sup. Docs.
No. Y1.1/8 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 103-395].
116. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, supra note 115, at 24-27.
117. Id. at 25-26.
118. See Brande Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination
and Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 185, 198-200 (1993).
119. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 199 (quoting War on Women Must Stop, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1989, at 15).
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Testimony from Congress also included the fact that more than
four million women are annually battered by husbands or former
husbands.121 In addition to these rape and domestic violence statis-
tics, Congress also heard estimates that such violence costs at least $3
billion annually, including the costs of criminal prosecutions, medical
treatment for victims, and the "lost careers, decreased productivity,
foregone educational opportunities, and long-term health costs."'22  As
a result of this testimony, Congress concluded:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate
business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved
in, interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender
have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate
products; .. .123
2. Congress Found the Connection in the Discouragement of
Interstate Travel
Congress' findings detailed the substantial affect of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce; yet, Congress also found
another method to validate its use of the commerce power to create the
VAWA civil right. That method was found in the parallel between
race-motivated violence and gender-motivated violence. That
connection was detailed in the following passage from the legislative
history:
Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or
gender bias, the results are often the same. The victims of such
violence are reduced to symbols of hatred; they are chosen not
because of who they are as individuals but because of their class
status. The violence not only wounds physically, it degrades and
terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly
situated. 124
121. H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, supra note 115.
122. S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 33 (1991), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 101-545] (emphasis added).
123. H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, pt. IV, at 385 (1994), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 103-7111.
124. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 49 (1991), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 103-138].
[Vol. 21:12 511268
VA WA and Interstate Commerce
Because the civil right to be free from race-motivated violence
parallels the civil right to be free from gender-motivated violence,
congressional use of the commerce power to enact such legislation
should be identically evaluated. 12  Creation of the civil right to be
free from racially-motivated violence was upheld as a constitutional use
of the commerce power in Griffin v. Breckenridge.126  The Supreme
Court held that Congress had the authority to forbid private actions
that violate civil rights because Congress has the power to regulate
activities, that substantially affect interstate commerce through
discouragement of interstate travel. 127  Seven years earlier in the
landmark ruling of Katzenbach v. McClung, the Supreme Court ruled
that racial discrimination in a restaurant discouraged interstate travel
and discouraged purchases of food and restaurant supplies, thereby
impacting both interstate travel and interstate commerce in restaurant
supplies. 12' That same year, the Court held that racial discrimination
in lodging also discouraged interstate travel in another landmark
decision, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.129  In each of
these three cases, the majority opinion focused on the discouragement
of interstate travel caused by the climate of fear created by racial
discrimination, often accompanied by racially-motivated violence.
Because the Lopez majority failed to address the government's
argument that interstate travel is a basis to find that an activity has a
substantial affect on interstate commerce, 3 ' Lopez does not change
the precedential value of the aforementioned interstate travel cases.
Consequently, if Congress finds the regulated activity will discourage
interstate travel, then it substantially affects interstate commerce.
Congress must have found that gender-motivated violence
discourages interstate travel if VAWA's civil right is constitutional
under the Supreme Court's interstate travel jurisprudence. 3' How-
ever, a reviewing court need only examine congressional findings to
determine if Congress had a rational basis for making the conclu-
125. Congress may use the commerce power to enact civil rights legislation when it is acting
to guarantee protection of the right of interstate travel. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241.
When determining whether such legislation is constitutional, the Court need only decide if a
rational basis exists to connect the prohibited activity to the discouragement of interstate travel.
See id.
126. 402 U.S. 88 (1971).
127. Id.
128. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
129. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
130. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241.
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sion. 32  In Katzenbach, the Court examined testimony before Con-
gress, not formal findings, to determine that a rational basis existed for
Congress to conclude that race-based discrimination in a restaurant
discouraged interstate travel.133  Accordingly, this Comment will
examine testimony before Congress on the issue of discouragement of
interstate travel as a rational basis for finding the connection to
interstate commerce.
First, Congress was told that high rates of rape and other crimes
deter women from taking public transportation. 34 Fear of taking
public transportation, whether planes, trains, or buses, could discourage
interstate travel. Congress was also told of the high threat of rape on
college campuses, as one in seven female college students is likely to
be raped before she graduates.13 When that threat allegedly became
reality for college student Christy Brzonkala, the plaintiff in Brzonkala,
it illustrated how the threat of gender -motivated violence discourages
interstate travel.
Brzonkala's claims are detailed in the Fourth Circuit panel's
decision." 6 Brzonkala traveled from her home state of in the fall of
1994 Minnesota to attend Virginia Tech.'37 After she was allegedly
gang-raped in a university dormitory on September 21, 1994,
Brzonkala withdrew from the university and returned to Minneso-
ta.' She said the reason she withdrew was, in part, because she
feared future gender-motivated attacks similar to the one she suf-
fered.3 9 She enrolled in a university located four miles from her
parents' home because she could live in safety there while attending
college. 4' Her alleged experience illustrates how a woman may be
discouraged from interstate travel because of fear of gender-motivated
violence.
Fear of rape and violent assault discourage interstate travel by
women. 141 Women avoid areas perceived as unsafe. 42  This cli-
132. Id.
133. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299.
134. Testimony of Sally Goldfarb, on behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights (Nov.
16, 1993), available in 1993 WL 747510 (F.D.C.H.).
135. Id.
136. Brzonhala, 132 F.3d at 953-54.
137. Id.
138. Id.; Nina Bernstein, Ground-breaking Suit Brings Rape Complaint to Light at College,
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Feb. 13, 1996, at 5A.
139. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955.
140. Bernstein, supra note 138, at 5A.
141. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Symposium, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: A
Promise Waiting to be Fulfilled, 4 JL. & POL'Y 371, 431 ("It tells us to keep silent, to stay home
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mate of fear is a factor that may make them less likely to visit
restaurants or hotels that cater to interstate travelers, as in the interstate
travel cases previously mentioned.
The obvious parallel between race-based civil rights and gender-
based civil rights may be vulnerable to criticism. Race-based civil
rights violations and the resulting impact on interstate commerce were
directly connected to businesses engaged in interstate commerce, but
VAWA does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate a connection to
interstate commerce to prevail in a federal lawsuit. Such criticism is
misguided, because the Supreme Court's interstate travel jurisprudence
requires a showing of discouragement of interstate travel based on the
climate of fear engendered, not a showing that the violence occurred in
a business.' Similar to race-based violence, gender-based violence
also discourages interstate travel based on the climate of fear.
Congress made specific findings of how gender-motivated violence
substantially affects interstate commerce. Congress relied on the
similar impact on interstate travel, whether the violence was motivated
by gender or by race. As a result, the Supreme Court should find that
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that creating a civil right to
be free from gender-motivated violence was a proper use of the
commerce power.
B. VAWA Does not Infringe on Traditional Areas of State Concern
According to Lopez, even though Congress had a rational basis for
making the connection to interstate commerce, VAWA must still not
intrude into traditional areas of state concern.'44 Unlike the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, where the traditional areas of state concern
were crime and education, VAWA's civil rights remedy does not
infringe on states' rights because (1) federal civil rights by definition
are no business of the states, (2) existence of a federal civil right does
not prevent states from criminally prosecuting those who assault others
based on gender, and (3) existence of a federal civil right does not
prevent a victim from seeking state tort remedies, such as assault or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
First, a federal civil right is the province of the federal govern-
ment. Although several states have created state civil rights, 14 none
and out of the streets, and to stay out of the public arenas.").
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
145. Several states have enacted state civil rights to be free from gender- motivated violence.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (1997) (making it a crime to target a person for
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of those state rights are enforceable outside the respective state's
boundaries. Only Congress can establish a federal civil right enforce-
able across the country. Therefore, creation of a federal civil right to
be free from gender-motivated violence is not a traditional area of state
concern.
Second, while VAWA does not require a criminal prosecution
before a civil rights claim may be filed in federal court,
146 VAWA
does not stop state and local prosecutors from criminally prosecuting
those who commit gender-motivated crimes. If a federal civil rights
violation did prohibit state criminal prosecutions, California could not
have prosecuted the four Los Angeles police officer accused in the
beating of Rodney King. 147 California did prosecute all four officers,
although a jury acquitted the officers. 14  The -federal government
then prosecuted the officers on criminal charges of violating King's
federal civil rights and convicted two of the officers. 149  King then
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officers. 5 ' By analogy,
if the prospect of a civil suit for violation of King's civil rights had no
effect on criminal prosecutions of his alleged assailants, then the
prospect of a VAWA claim should have no impact on criminal
prosecutions of those who commit gender-motivated violence.
Third, nothing in VAWA requires a victim of gender-motivated
violence to resort to the federal courts rather than state courts. Instead,
VAWA explicitly declares that federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction in these matters. 5' In fact, some scholars believe that
the existence of a federal civil right will enhance state tort actions by
underlining the seriousness of the offense and communicating the
intolerable nature of such violence.15
2
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons why VAWA does not
encroach on state sovereignty, VAWA itself explicitly forbids
encroachment by the federal courts into state law issues such as
violence based on gender); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a) (1998 & West Supp. 1996) (treating
gender-based violence as a civil rights violation). Other states with similar statutes include
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Vermont.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(2) (1994).
147. See John Hurst, LAPD Rights Panel Urges Firing Powell, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2993,




151. 42 U.S.C. § 13 981(e)(3) (1994).
152. See W.H. Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault
Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577 (1993).
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divorce, alimony, child custody, and property settlements.15 3  A
VAWA claim may not be used to bootstrap such cases into federal
courts through use of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
section 1367.54
Congress found a connection between gender-motivated violence
and interstate commerce and explained its rationale in formal find-
ings."' Creation of a federal right to be free from gender-motivated
violence does not infringe on any area of traditional state concern.
Therefore, the Court should find VAWA constitutional.
C. Policy Reasons for Upholding VAWA
In addition to the aforementioned reasons for finding VAWA
constitutional, several policy reasons also support VAWA. First, the
Court should allow Congress to make political judgments that could
have more than one outcome. Second, individuals should have a right
not to be victimized simply because of their gender. Third, stare
decisis in interstate travel cases should not be overlooked.
First, the Court should stay out of congressional decisions that are
political judgments."5 6  The tension between the judiciary and
legislative branches dates back to the formation of the country, as
illustrated by the landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison.'57
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that "[g]iven the deference due
'the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and
representative branch of our Government,' [courts should not] lightly
second-guess such legislative judgments. "158 Of course, that
does not mean that the Supreme Court can never question a congres-
sional decision. However, as the Lopez Court stated, the Court need
only determine whether a rational basis exists to justify congressional
action based on Commerce Clause authority.'59 But the Court must
be mindful that "every act of Congress is entitled to a 'strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality."" 6
153. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4 ) (1994); see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2) (1994).
155. See S. Rep. No. 101-545, supra note 122, at 43; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, supra
note 123, at 385, and S. Rep. No. 103-138, supra note 124, at 29.
156. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579. See also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
157. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
158. Westside Comm. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990) (quoting Walters
v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985)) (citation omitted).
159. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
160. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 964 (quoting Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 955 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
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Congress made such a political judgment when it enacted VAWA,
as it took more than four years of debate before enough support was
gathered to ensure passage."' Political judgments should remain in
the hands of the legislative branch and the judiciary should do no more
than determine whether the decisions made by Congress are constitu-
tional. A court should not substitute its judgment for that of
Congress. By examining whether a connection to interstate commerce
is sufficient, the Brzonkala district court held that its judgment was
superior to that of Congress.162 The Supreme Court should avoid
making the same mistake.
Second, every person should be free from being victimized simply
because that person is a member of a specific class. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides protection to all
individuals.'63 However, equal treatment of women on an issue as
basic to a democracy as the right to vote was not granted until the
Nineteenth Amendment was adopted in 1920.164
Congress later prohibited the unequal treatment of women in the
workplace when it provided protection from gender-based attacks or
discrimination in the workplace under Title VII. 165  VAWA only
extends that protection to the times when a woman is not at work, as
"current law provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes commit-
ted in the workplace, but not for crimes of violence motivated by
gender committed on the street or in the home.' 6
6
The need for making the policy choice to include gender among
the classes deserving of federal protection becomes clear when looking
at the statistics Congress examined during the four-year debate over
VAWA's passage. Violence is the leading cause of injury among
women ages 15-44.167 At least 21,000 domestic crimes were reported
to police each week in 1991, and authorities estimated the true number
of such crimes to be triple that figure. 168  More than 2,000 women
were raped each week in 1991, and more than 90 women were
161. The legislative history stretches from 1990, with S. Rep. No. 101-545, supra note 122,
through its passage in 1994.
162. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 949.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
164. The Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
165. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1994).
166. H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, supra note 123, at 385.
167. H.R. Rep. No. 103-395; supra note 115, at 25 (citing Surgeon General Antonio
Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)).
168. S. Rep. No. 103-138, supra note 124, at 37.
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murdered each week, with 90 percent of those women killed by
men. 69 Experts estimate that three out of four American women
will be victims of violent crimes sometime during their lifetimes.
171
The staggering cost of violence against women is at least $5 billion to
$10 billion in health care, criminal justice, and other social costs.''
Viewing these statistics, it should come as no surprise that Congress
chose to protect a class of citizens that clearly needs protection.
Third, stare decisis provides the Court a reason to grant deference
to congressional findings of a connection between interstate commerce
and violence motivated by gender. In their Lopez concurrence, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor found that stare decisis "operates with great
force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles
now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions
of a commercial nature."'72 The stare decisis cases involved here are
those dealing with interstate travel.'73 The threat of gender-motivat-
ed violence discourages interstate travel, as it did for Christy Brzon-
kala. 174 Therefore, Congress may use its commerce power to forbid
such violence.
VAWA was the result of a political judgment, and the Supreme
Court should be hesitant to declare such legislative judgment unconsti-
tutional unless there exists no rational basis to support it. In addition,
stare decisis based on the interstate travel cases supports upholding
VAWA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In passing VAWA in 1994, Congress met the Lopez requirement
that it make specific findings of how gender-motivated violence
substantially affects interstate commerce, and did so even before the
Supreme Court enunciated that requirement in 1995. Congress found
both an empirical connection in the loss of worker productivity due to
injuries from violence and an interstate travel connection that paralleled
race-based civil rights legislation that had been previously upheld as a
proper use of the commerce power. As a result, VAWA is constitu-
169. Id. at 38.
170. H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, supra note 115, at 25 (citing U.S. Department of Justice,
Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice 29 (2d ed. 1988)).
171. S. Rep. No. 103-138, supra note 124, at 41 (citations omitted).
172. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574.
173. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
174. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953-54; Bernstein, supra note 138, at SA. See also supra notes
136-43 and accompanying text.
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tional and the Supreme Court is likely to deny certiorari in the
Brzonkala case.
VAWA has the potential to be a powerful tool against gender-
motivated violence. The Supreme Court should allow Congress to use
its commerce power to give victims of such violence, whether they be
women or men, the same right to seek justice in the federal courts as
that possessed by victims of race-based violence. A federal civil right
to be free from gender-motivated violence is not only fair, but it is
constitutional.
